1. Bomb attacks
1.1 Between 1.02 and 1.04 a.m. of 27.5.1993, a massive explosion occurred in the centre of Florence, on the corner of Via dei Georgofili and Via Lambertesca.
The explosion caused the collapse of one wing of the Torre dei Pulci, headquarters of the Georgofili Academy, and the home of the caretaker who died together with his wife and two young daughters.
Many other people (36) were injured by the blast and its devastating effects.
Historical buildings nearby were demolished and a student died in the fire that broke out in the building where he was living, located in Via Lambertesca, 3, in front of the Torre dei Pulci.
The explosion effects were devastating causing a number of casualties and damage to monuments, artistic and historical buildings and works of art.
And in fact:
- the Torre dei Pulci, headquarters of the Georgofili Academy, was completely destroyed, the Uffizi Gallery, Palazzo Vecchio, the Church of S. Stefano and Cecilia at Ponte Vecchio, the Museum of Science and Technology were severely damaged;
- the following works of art were lost:
- the Uffizi Gallery: Gherardo delle Notti - "Adoration of the shepherds"; Manfredi - "Card players"; Manfredi - "Concert";
- the Georgofili Academy: Bimbi - "Eagle"; Scacciati - "Vultures, owls and woodcock"; Grant (print) - "Hunting scene"; Landseer (print) - "Big deer in a marsh";
- the following works of art were severely damaged:
- the Uffizi Gallery: Van der Weyden - "Deposition in the sepulchre"; Sebastiano del Piombo - "Adonis's death"; Cristofano dell'Altissimo - "Portrait of Giovanni della Casa"; Gregorio Pagani - "Priam and Thisbe"; Rubens - "Henry IV at the battle of Ivry"; Rubens - "Portrait of Philip I of Spain"; C. Lorrain - "Harbour with Villa Medici"; Bernini - "Angel's head"; Gherardo delle Notti - "Adoration of Infant Jesus"; Gherardo delle Notti - "The good luck"; Gherardo delle Notti - "Dinner with lute players"; Manfredi - "Tribute to Caesar"; Manfredi "Dispute with Doctors"; F. Rustici - "Lucretia's death"; A. Gentileschi - "Judith and Holophernes"; A. Gentileschi - "St. Catherine"; G. Reni - "David with Goliath's head"; B. Strozzi - "Parable of the guest at the wedding feast"; Empoli - "Still-life"; Empoli - "Still-life"; R. Manetti - "Massinissa and Sophonisba"; G.B. Spinelli - "David warmly welcomed by young girls"; G.B. Spinelli - "David placates Saul's anger; N. Reiner "A play"; School of Caravaggio - "St. Thomas's disbelief"; Valentin - " Dice players"; School of Caravaggio - "Liberation of St. Peter"; Borgognone - "Radicofani battle"; M. Caffi - "Flowers"; Gerardo delle Notti - "Dinner with thebetrothed";
- the Georgofili Academy: Bimbi - "Pelican"; "Flowers" (n. 2 - castle inv: 576 and 578);
- the following works of art were seriously damaged:
- the Uffizi Gallery: Bronzino - "Portrait of a lady"; Van Douven - "Glorification of the Palatine Electors"; School of A. Gaddi - "Triptych: Madonna and Saints"; Maso da San Friano - "Icarus's fall"; Giovanni da San Giovanni - "The Virgin with Infant Jesus and St. Francis"; R. Van der Weyden - "Deposition"; Pontormo - "The Virgin with Infant Jesus"; Garofalo - "Madonna and Saints"; Vasari - "Portrait of Duke Alexander"; Raffaellino Del Garbo - "The Virgin with Infant Jesus"; Puccinelli - "The Virgin with Infant Jesus"; ; A. Micheli - "St. Catherine"; School of Caravaggio - "Double portrait"; unknown author "Lying Infant Jesus"; unknown - "St. John the Evangelist"; Roman school - "Portrait of Porzia De' Rossi"; Fra' Bartolomeo - "Porzia"; Velasquez - "Riding noblewoman"; School of Pollaiolo - "Justice"; Tiziano - "The last supper"; XV cen. school - "The Virgin with Infant Jesus"; A Cecchi - "Self-portrait"; V. Campanello - "Self-portrait"; C. Baba - "Self-portrait"; M. De Matchva - "Self-portrait"; Farulli -
"Self-portrait";
- the Institute and Museum of History and Science: "Cimento Academy's cylindrical vase", XVII cen., 27 cm high, diam. 9 cm, glass (catal. IX,66), cracks in the vase PLATE, - irreparable damage - irremediable impairment of the object; "Tray", XVII cen., glass, diam. approximately 46 cm (catal. IX,85), cracked - irreparable; "Reflecting telescope", wood, by Leto Guidi, XVIII cen. (catal, XI,1), scratches on the tube's surface - restorable; "Reflecting telescope", wood XVII cen. (catal, XI,2), scratches on the tube's surface - restorable; "Santucci armillary sphere", XVI cen. (catal. VII,30), broken armilla - detachment of the polar cap - structure impairment - repairable (with some difficulty) damage;
- the following sculptures were damaged:
- the Uffizi Gallery: Hellenistic art: "Niobide"; Roman art: "Adolescent's head"; copy of the Roman period of "Myron's discobolus".
During the initial stage of site inspection it was impossible to ascertain the real cause of the explosion because of night-time and the devastation to the entire building and urban structure; at dawn, parts of metal steel and of a car engine were found amidst the wreckage; this finding led to the conclusion that the explosion was caused by a car bomb.
The on-site inspection then continued with the removal of debris leading to the discovery of a three-metre long, two-metre wide and two-metre deep crater at roadway level: this confirmed that explosives were used in the attack.
It was established that the explosion occurred between 1,02 and 1,04 a.m. on 27.05.1993, since the time of the attack could not be detected more accurately even after further investigation because of a temporary equipment failure at the Osservatorio Ximeniano in Florence.
1.1.1 During the course of the investigation a car engine was found amongst the debris with registration and code numbers still identifiable belonging to a FIAT Fiorino motor van, bearing a number-plate FI H90593, property of the F.A.I.R. company and in the use of a member of the company staff, who on 27.05.1993 at 9.25 a.m. had reported its theft, presumably on 26.05.1993, not before 7.30 p.m. (when the van had still been parked at Via della Scala).
Later, on the basis of witnesses' depositions and technical assessments, it was established that the motor van had been stolen between 7.30 and 7.45 p.m.
The witnesses' statements were further confirmed by the assessments of two experts who carried out a computerised analysis of images filmed by a camera of the "Simoni" Barracks located in Via della Scala, a few hundred metres away from the place where the theft had occurred. The outcome of this analysis confirmed the accuracy of the van driver's recollection of his time of arrival and parking.
To be exact, the image-processing technique showed the following: the Fiorino motor van arrived at exactly 7:27:41 p.m.; furthermore, the images indicated that it was highly probable that by 7:29:52 the vehicle was no longer there. In any case, at 7:35:50 the vehicle was not where it had been previously parked.
1.1.2 The ballistics technical consultants' assessments confirmed the theory of an attack carried out by means of a car bomb. They performed the appropriate chemical-explosive power tests on the findings and more general assessments of all aspects characterising the attack. In fact:
a. in their preliminary report, presented on 20.07.1993, the technical consultants, from tests carried out on the findings, specified that the liquid phase chromatography (HPLC) indicated the presence of trinitrotoluene, T4 and penthrite, while further tests were necessary to prove the possible presence of nitroglycerine, nitroglycol (EGDN) and Dinitrotoluene (DNT).
As to the presence of trinitrotoluene (TNT), experts stressed, as well as confirming the analytical data, that "At the scene of the explosion, both the material from the crater and some façades of the adjacent buildings (the wreckage of the "Torre del Pulci", headquarters of the Georgofili Academy and of the building located in Via Lambertesca, n.4) revealed some deeply blackened areas caused by superficial deposits of very fine carbon powder. These deep darkening effects are typical of explosions from charges partly composed of trinitrotoluene as a separate explosive substance, that is not well mixed with other explosive components".
As to the quantity of explosive material employed, the experts indicated the following: "what is clear is that the minute fragments in the debris from the Fiat Fiorino (the car bomb) prove that its engine block (cylinder head and gooseneck) is partially broken. To be more specific, the debris from the Fiorino body are generally not larger than 10 cm, including pieces belonging to the front of the car (engine bonnet, etc.) located far away from the explosive charge. This indicates quite a large weight of exploded charge, certainly more than that of the charge exploded in the Fiat 126 car bomb in Via D'Amelio (PA) used for the killing of Judge Borsellino (around 95-100 kg, as resulted from calculations and blast tests); the fragments found from the Fiat 126 car in Via D'Amelio were on the whole larger than those of the Fiorino van".
b. the second preliminary report dated on 27.07.1993, concerning the investigations performed on the evidence gathered by the Criminal Laboratory Department, indicates that investigation techniques such as Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrophotometry (GC/MS) were applied, proving that the explosive charge was definitely composed of the following explosives: Trinitrotoluene (TNT), T4, Penthrite (PNT) and Dinitrotoluene (DNT) isomers.
c. in the report presented on 20.08.1993, experts examined the "charge weight" characteristics more closely.
The reference parameters employed are those of the so-called "Blast geometry", therefore the size of the crater (ellipse-shaped with diameters from 2,900 and 4,430 mm, and 1,410 mm maximum depth), the height of the Fiorino van's loading space from the ground, the loading compartment surface, the characteristics of the soil's stratified materials (stone pavement, concrete, sandy and argillaceous landfill materials).
Therefore, on the basis of the crater volume and of the various soil strata's mechanical resistance and by applying a computerised method, taking into consideration blast geometry, the explosives' energy and the soil's fluid-dynamic response, the following considerations may be drawn: on the assumption of an explosive charge exclusively composed of trinitrotoluene, the computed results indicate a 275 kg charge weight. When this is applied to an explosive mixture including equal parts of Trinitrotoluene, Penthrite plastic and T4 plastic, the resulting charge weight is approximately 250 kg.
Furthermore, experts found that the FIAT Fiorino motor van, number-plate FI/H90593 used in the attack was white in colour. In fact, parts of the number-plate belonging to the van and pieces of the engine registration number were found near the blast epicentre.
To assess the blast dynamics and to determine the position of the explosive charge inside the vehicle, reconstruction of the van was carried out by placing and fixing the fragments collected on a metallic rod frame reproducing the size and shape of the FIAT Fiorino on a 1:1 scale...The front part of the vehicle was partially reconstructed after finding and identifying fragments from the engine compartment (cylinder head, clutch, gear box, radiator), the forecarriage, two tyre rims, the left front door and the engine bonnet. The attached photographic documentation clearly proves that the metallic parts of the Fiorino van's back are completely "missing". The only fragments found possibly belonging to that part of the vehicle were from the back-wheel suspensions and the tyre rims....From these results, we can assume that the explosive charge used in the Via dei Georgofili bomb attack was placed in the Fiorino van's back loading compartment, as shown by the scattering of fragments from the various parts of the v
ehicle. This assumption is further supported by the minute fragmentation of the body of the van and from the position of the heavy mechanical components, such as the engine and the forecarriage found some 30 m away from the crater.
1.1.3 The experts also emphasized similarities with methods and techniques employed in other recent terrorist attacks which do not require any further remarks:
- the explosive charge used in the Palermo-Capaci attack on 23.5.1993 when Judge Giovanni Falcone, his wife and bodyguards were killed was composed of Trinitrotoluene (mainly), T4 and "some explosive used for civil applications (probably belonging to the gelatin category)... Penthrite was also detected on one finding only;
- the explosive charge used in the attack on 19.7.1992 in Palermo where Magistrate Paolo Borsellino and his bodyguards were killed weighed approximately 100 kg and was mainly composed of "Penthrite and T4 ... however, Trinitrotoluene and a small quantity of explosives for civil applications (probably belonging to the gelatine category) were also found". It is well-known that a car bomb was used in the bomb attack in Via D'Amelio.
1.2 At this point, some preliminary and provisional conclusions may be drawn: injuries to people and damage to the artistic heritage caused by the blast, interpreted in relation to the methods and techniques employed by the perpetrators, leave no doubts as to the offensive potential of the lethal explosive device placed in the heart of a town representative of art throughout Italy and the World, nor regarding the terrorist and destructive nature of the attack itself.
Furthermore, the investigations held to verify whether the car bomb's target might be a physical person, led to the exclusion of this possibility.
Consequently, taking into consideration the devastation of a "small part" of the historic and inhabited centre of the city and of the monuments and artistic buildings nearby located - in particular the Uffizi Gallery, universally recognised as the most prestigious and well known museum in the World - it appears that the perpetrators intentionally chose Florence historic centre as the target of their attack against the inestimable artistic heritage it houses and for the consequent representativeness of the target chosen for the bomb attack.
1.3 The Via dei Georgofili bomb attack, both for its "historical" aspect and as the object of preliminary investigations carried out, occurred in between other equally severe terrorist attacks that took place on Italian territory between 14.5.1993 and 28.7.1993.
At this point, it is important to highlight the objective data characterising the aforementioned terrorist attacks to assess the existing relationships and implications we will now refer to.
1.3.1 On 14.5.1993 at approximately 9.40 p.m. a massive blast occurred in Rome, along Via Ruggero Fauro, near the corner of Via Boccioni, causing the following: 21 people (taken to various hospitals in the city) and many others (treated on site by doctors participating in the relief operations) were injured; many vehicles parked and in transit were damaged; damage to many building walls.
The investigations and the technical assessments required by the Prosecutor led to the following conclusions:
- the target of the bomb attack was the journalist Maurizio COSTANZO;
- the device's estimated detrimental and harmful range in relation to primary splinters was approximately 250 m; the estimated overpressure and impact lethal range was approximately 25 m; the estimated lethal range of splinters was approximately 100 m;
- the car bomb used was a Fiat UNO, number-plate Rome M12957, stolen between 11.5.1993 and 12.5.1993;
- the explosive charge used - placed in the boot of the Fiat UNO - included the following explosives: Trinitrotoluene, T4, Penthrite, quarry gelatinised explosive with a high content of Nitroglyceroglycole (NG + EGDN) whose estimated weight was between 100 and 120 kg. More specifically, at that time experts working for the Prosecutor detected seven explosive components: 1) Nitroglycerine (NG), 2) Ethylenglycoldinitrate (EGDN), 3) Dinitrotoluene (DNT) isomers, 4) Ammonium Nitrate (AN), 5) 2,4,6, Trinitrotoluene (TNT), 6) T4, 7) Penthrite.
1.3.2 On 27.7.1993, at 11.14 p.m. a massive blast occurred in Via Palestro in Milan causing the following: five people died; at least ten more were injured; some cars and buildings were seriously damaged.
Here too investigations by explosive device experts, led to the following conclusions:
- severe damage in particular to the Padiglione di Arte contemporanea (P.A.C.) (Contemporary Art Pavilion). The car bomb had been parked in Via Palestro between buildings number 12 and 14 (50 m apart). Building number 14 is the entrance to the Padiglione di Arte Contemporanea and the boundary wall of the building terminates at number 12. Building number 16 is the official address of the Gallery of Modern Art. No other artistic or cultural buildings are located in the area of the attack;
- the car bomb used was a Fiat UNO stolen in Milan between 23.7.1993 and 24.7.1993;
- the explosive charge was placed inside the boot of the vehicle (as was confirmed by people who had seen inside the car before the blast);
- the explosive charge was composed of quarry gelatinised explosives with a high nytroglyceroglycole content (NG+EGDN), Trinitrotoluene, T4 and Penthrite; in other words, in terms of "explosive components", the bomb was made up of : 1) Nitroglycerine (NG), 2) Ethylenglycoldinitrate (EGDN), 3) Dinitrotoluene (DNT) isomers, 4) Ammonium Nitrate (AN), 5) 2,4,6, Trinitrotoluene (TNT), 6) T4 (RDX), 7) Penthrite (PETN);
- the estimated quantity of the explosive charge was approximately 90/100 kg.
1.3.3 Two explosions occurred in Rome, in Piazza San Giovanni in Laterano and in front of the Church of San Giorgio in Velabro, on 27.7.1993 at 11.58 p.m. and on 28.7.1993 at 0.02 a.m. respectively. Both explosions were produced by a car bomb. The first caused the following: severe damage to the walls of the Basilica di San Giovanni in Laterano and to the Palazzo Lateranense; damage to vehicles parked or in transit around the area. The second blast caused the following: damage to the walls of the Church of San Giorgio al Velabro and nearby buildings; damage to many vehicles parked in the neighbourhood.
The investigations, including explosive power tests, led to the following conclusions:
regarding the bomb attack in Piazza San Giovanni:
- the car bomb was a Fiat UNO, number-plate Roma/8A6003, stolen in Rome on 26.7.1993 between 9.00 p.m. and 11 p.m.,
- the explosive charge was placed inside the back part of the vehicle;
for the bomb attack in front of the Church of San Giorgio al Velabro:
- the car bomb was a Fiat UNO, number-plate Roma/91909Y, stolen in Rome between 26.7.1993, 8.30 p.m. and 27.7.1993, 13.30 p.m.;
- the explosive charge was placed inside the back part of the vehicle;
for both bomb attacks:
- the explosive charge was composed of quarry gelatinised explosives with a high nytroglyceroglycole content (NG+EGDN), trinitrotoluene, T4 and Penthrite; in other words, in terms of "explosive components", the bomb was made up of : 1)Nitro-glycerine (NG), 2) ethylenglycoldinitrate (EGDN), 3) Dinitrotoluene (DNT) isomers, 4) 2,4,6, trinitrotoluene (TNT), 5) T4 (RDX) , 6) Penthrite (PETN);
- the estimated quantity of the explosive charge used for each attack was between 100 and 120 kg.
1.4 The analytical overview of elements and facts carried out so far is functional and sufficient to prove that the terrorist attacks occurred in this country between May 14 and July 28 1993, have one origin, one planner and one perpetrator.
In fact,
concerning the means employed:
1. the car bomb technique was used in all cases;
2. in all attacks an explosive mixture was used, composed of several explosives identifiable by the technical experts for each and every attack: Trinitrotoluene, T4, Penthrite, Quarry Gelatinised Explosives.
3. vehicles stolen shortly before the attacks were used in all cases;
4. in 4 bomb attacks out of 5 a Fiat UNO was employed; only on 27.5.1993 a motor van was used: this is (most probably) explained by what is indicated under item 6;
5. in all cases, the explosive charge was placed in the back of the vehicle and in the attacks on 14.5 (Rome) and 27.7 (Milan) it was placed in the boot;
6. in all bomb attacks, a remarkable quantity of explosives was used, more than 100 kg (the estimated quantity varied from 90-100 kg for the Via Palestro attack to 100-120 kg for the Via Fauro, San Giovanni in Laterano and San Giorgio al Velabro attacks). The quantity of explosives used in the Via dei Georgofili bomb attack (250 kg) is twice as large as the quantity used in the other attacks.
The estimated total quantity of explosives used in the 5 terrorist attacks is somewhere between 640 and 710 kg.
as for other objective connotations of the facts concerned:
7. in four cases out of five, the attack took place between one hour before and one hour after midnight. Also in the fifth case (Rome - Via Fauro) the bomb attack took place during the night;
8. in three cases the attacks took place in Rome;
9. three attacks (one in Milan and two in Rome) occurred during the same night (between 27.7.1993 and 28.7.1993), less than one hour elapsing between the first attack and the last one;
general and conclusive connotations of objective data:
10. the five terrorist attacks have "territory" in common, the continental territory of the State, and "time", represented by the May-July trimester of 1993: this consideration is not tautological in nature, since no other similar terrorist attacks took place during the year 1993, either before or after the three months in question, anywhere in the continental territory of the State. The same applies to the previous years and the following. In other words, the five terrorist attacks are concentrated in time and space;
11. in four attacks out of five, secondary goals were identified alongside the main target governed by the reference criminal rules. In fact, the perpetrators of the attack coupled their intention to kill with their intention to destroy selected and serial (emerging from the reconstruction of the events) targets: in two cases, buildings where works of art are preserved and exhibited. This means that those two buildings reflected the artistic and historical dimension of the specific geographical and social context. In two other cases, the targets were places of worship for the Christian-Catholic religion of unique architectural, historical and artistic value.
2. Terrorist attacks and their underlying strategy and links with the mafia organisation of "Cosa Nostra"
This initial objective data indicates that "the single protagonist" behind the terrorist plan, also implemented in the Via dei Georgofili attack, must be a criminal organisation able to: define a strategy; view the attack as an instrument in line with that strategy and, more specifically, with the targets pursued; support this strategy by organisational skills, in terms of material and human resources, capable to cope with specific short-term management needs or to perpetrate multiple criminal acts in different cities within a very short timeframe.
Multiple elements suggest that the aforementioned criminal organisation is to be identified with the Mafia organisation par excellence called "Cosa Nostra".
Before reviewing these elements it is necessary to stress once more the remarkable similarity between the composition of the explosive mixture used for the car bomb that went off on 19.7.1993, and the composition of all explosive charges used in the May-July 1993 "continental" bomb attacks, as well as in the Capaci bomb attack on 23.5.1992. In both cases, the investigations carried out by the Caltanissetta Anti-Mafia District Administration led first to the introduction of preventive measures, and later to criminal proceedings against many "Cosa Nostra" members.
2.1 Important information concerns in first place the concrete Cosa Nostra strategy in this particular historical moment and the following operational decisions adopted: decisions which have identified "bomb attacks" as the key implementation strategy.
2.1.1 As to the "motive" of this strategy, it should be noted that through decree law n. 306 dated 8.6.1992 turned into law n. 356 dated 7.8.1992, sub-section 2 of art. 41 bis of the Penitentiary Law was introduced. The enforcement of this regulation implied severe limitations to some prisoners, in particular to those accused of being members of "Mafia-like" criminal organisations who could no longer have any contact with people outside the prison (consequently, any direct or indirect links with the criminal organisation they belonged to), or, by far and large, with any other inmate, particularly with other inmates also accused of being members of criminal organisations. Such a provision represented an irreplaceable support to the concrete implementation of the reduced sentence scheme introduced by decree law n. 152/1991, where new situations were emerging leading to new forms of co-operation with the magistrates: damage to the reputation of organisation bosses and to the prestige of the organisation itself;
damage to the parameters allowing criminal organisations to maintain their hierarchical and decision-making structure (inevitable consequence resulting from the impossibility for regular relationships with the organisation "bosses" in prison); material and especially psychological isolation of the prisoners.
On 11.8.1993 a supergrass, after declaring to the Rome Prosecutor that on September 1992, while being transferred from the Asinara prison to the Trani prison, gathered information from other inmates about some large scale attacks, and stated the following:"... we were supposed to stop in Sardinia where the Fornelli section was based and in Tuscany because (...) Pianosa... we wanted to make the State understand that we did not approve art. 41 bis. The ... said that if on 20 July 1993 art. 41 bis had not been overruled, there would have been a mess, some attacks would have been perpetrated. We were all notified about art. 41 bis on July 20 1993 and all documents also indicated the date of effect, one year. Art. 41 bis only allows us a few clothes in our cells... we could not have any coffee machines in our cells, we could not even cook, we could not buy any raw food, our mail was censured, we could not keep up a correspondence with convicts, not even with our families, the only contacts permitted, if they were convicted; we could not keep up a correspondence with other prisons, we were only allowed two hours of open air exercise a day (we were allowed four before)".
The same person who gave this information on 15.11.1994 also added: "Possible actions in Sardinia and in Tuscany, in the two prisons where art. 41 bis had been enforced, Asinara and Pianosa respectively, were aimed at making the State reconsider art. 41 bis. As I said, this provision had turned out to be unbearable to many criminal groups not due to the prison system itself but especially because it undermined the possibility for criminal groups to control prisoners. That could lead to complete isolation of individual prisoners who would then tend towards unacceptable choices: I mean, co-operation with the judicial authorities".
With reference to "Cosa Nostra" criminal organisation, to confirm the accuracy of these considerations, another supergrass, when interrogated by the Prosecutor of Caltanissetta on 16.02 1994, declared: "...I can say I have personally heard Salvatore RIINA, Bernardo PROVENZANO, Salvatore BIONDINO and Raffaele GANCI discuss the risk for "Cosa Nostra "of supergrass spreading . "Cosa Nostra" bosses, therefore the people I have just named, believed that the best plan to be immediately put into action was to throw discredit on supergrasses as much as possible and, at the same time, to discourage new ones by obtaining the withdrawal of the very regulation that had encouraged them to co-operate in the first place. Another instrument to avoid the emerging of new supergrasses' co-operations was the elimination of the regulations providing for the prison system, indicated under art. 41 bis: RIINA and the others saw the strict isolation and the hard living conditions envisaged by that system as a possible instrument to encourage new supergrasses to co-operate with the magistrates and consequently they had to be fought against".
The supergrass also specified that after the 1992 bomb attacks (the bomb attacks where Falcone and Borsellino were killed) and before his surrender to the CC (July 1993) and the 1993 bomb attacks, he was present during a conversation held between RIINA, GANCI and BIONDINO (who were both "Cosa Nostra" top level members). After RIINA was arrested, he was also present during several conversations between PROVENZANO and GANCI (the last of which took place in May 1993 after the bomb attack in Via Fauro in Rome, but before the terrorist attack in Florence) when they said the organisation was trying to convince the politicians they had relationships with to force the Italian legislation to follow the course indicated above.
On 8.3.1994, he further expounded his argument: "RIINA believed that supergrasses were the worst thing that could ever have happened to "Cosa Nostra" since they alone could jeopardise the organisation. RIINA used to say that he would have risked the most precious thing he had to get rid of the law on supergrasses and art. 41 that, forcing Mafia members into isolation and could produce more supergrasses".
In relation to the conversation that took place in May 1993, the same supergrass said that PROVENZANO wanted to pursue RIINA's strategy (RIINA was arrested on 15.1.1993) against supergrasses, specifying that "the car bombs that started with the Capaci attack, followed by Via D'Amelio, Rome, Florence and Milan are a continuing strategy, a struggle against supergrasses".
It must be noted that this supergrass did not express an evaluation, nor a personal opinion. His words just confirmed his personal knowledge of the facts. The connotation of his words is even clearer when compared with the deductive but confident tone of the phrases that followed when the supergrass did not speak about the strategy and the Mafia character any longer, but rather about targets to exclude any autonomous choice on the part of "Cosa Nostra" ("... who has not got a clever enough mind to prepare a car bomb like the one used in Florence"). He believed that those targets were "suggested targets" and added that the decision to perpetrate the bomb attack had been taken by "Cosa Nostra", that such a decision was certainly in force after RIINA's arrest and that probably RIINA himself had taken it before being arrested.
The supergrass's statements about the nature of the bomb attacks are confirmed and further clarified by another well-known supergrass who, however, sees the facts from a different angle, nearer to the execution-related aspects and reflecting his lower rank (he had been initiated into the organisation approximately one year before being arrested, and was about to become a "uomo d'onore" (man of honour).
When interrogated by the Rome Prosecutor on 8.4.1994, this supergrass said that in 1991, during a meeting called by RIINA, it was decided "to pose a challenge to the State by committing a series of murders and attacks also outside the island" and he significantly specified that they "had to have the typical characteristics of terrorist acts". The purpose of the attacks was to obtain the overruling of the penitentiary system introduced by art. 41 bis.
The decision taken by "Cosa Nostra" bosses to perform these purely terrorist attacks (to be interpreted as the operational implication of a global war against the State - of which the strategy aimed at neutralising the legislative decisions on organised crime was part) was clearly described by another supergrass interrogated on 03.12.1993: "... at the beginning of 1993 and, in any case, well after Capaci and Via d'Amelio attacks, I heard various conversations between BAGARELLA, CRUSCA and GIOE': They said they had to teach the politicians a lesson, to somehow damage their economic interests anywhere in Italy, also outside Sicily. They did not name any specific name. To give one example, they said that if a politician had a hotel chain in Rimini, a big quantity of infected syringes could be found on the beach in order to spoil the tourist business for the holiday season. In any case, at that point, BRUSCA's and especially BAGARELLA's attitude was that of those who are openly fighting against everybody with no hopes or expectations..." The supergrass's last words must be interpreted by taking into consideration that the "Martelli decree" dated 8.6.1992 had become law in August 1992 and the enforcement of art. 41 bis was fait accompli.
The supergrass was interrogated again on 18.04.1994. He confirmed what he had previously declared and added: "...In prison ... where I was sent (after the 1993 bomb attacks) I had the opportunity to speak to ... While talking about everything that had happened during the past two years ... he said that reassuring news had been received from Palermo, meaning that the situation was gradually improving and would become totally acceptable by 1995. Referring to the gradually improving situation... he made a specific reference to the penitentiary system and explained that pressure on prisoners held in custody under art. 41 bis would be released. Furthermore, he told me he believed that the Palermo group, responsible for all that had recently happened. "had gone too far". I remember he used the following words "did they want to beat the State" Did they have this in their mind?" Since I said ... that there were not many reasons to expect any improvement in the situation, particularly due to the supergrasses' co-op
eration with the magistrates, he replied that it was not enough to destroy "Cosa Nostra", that "Cosa Nostra" had always gone through hard times and, finally, that a plan had already been completed to neutralise supergrasses' collaboration".
Therefore, the motive underlying "Cosa Nostra" strategy in relation to a highly criminal action plan outside Sicily against the reduced sentence system and art. 41 bis has been well described. Two considerations have to be made to integrate the supergrasses' declarations: the "Cosa Nostra" bosses' strong will to force the State, at any price, to change its mind over the 1991-'92 choices on criminal policy; their choice to support their decision with terrorist attacks on the State mainland, particularly in regions, like Tuscany, in prisons where art. 41 bis had been enforced.
This last consideration is further supported by another supergrass's declaration. He said: "I was in the Rebibbia prison when the tv broadcast the news of the Via Fauro attack (against the journalist Maurizio COSTANZO who had expressed his approval for the arrest of RIINA, unquestioned head of "Cosa Nostra", on 15.1.1993). I could only interpret the fact on the basis of my personal opinion since I did not have any knowledge of the fact itself. I interpreted the Via Fauro attack as "Cosa Nostra" 's show of force addressed to prisoners, particularly those held in custody under the system regulated by art. 41 bis. The purpose of this message was to make prisoners feel no longer left alone and, consequently, to discourage them from becoming supergrasses. I made the same consideration when I heard about the bomb attack in Florence and I also thought that by its action in Florence, "Cosa Nostra" had even gone further north and was getting closer to the Pianosa prison, where many Mafia members were held in custody
under art. 41 bis".
2.1.2 Further investigations continued to show the implementation of the strategy in Tuscany against historical and artistic assets.
A man, who was not a Cosa Nostra member, but who in the past had maintained links with a boss of the organisation for reasons that are not pertinent to our purposes and whose declarations have been confirmed, said:
"When I met GIOE', our conversation took place in different contexts: we talked before lunch and then we had lunch together; then he went away for a while, leaving me at the gas station (GIOE' was actually the owner of a gas station in Altofonte), then we went to a house near the gas station together. At lunch. GIOE' expressed his concern and anger about the attitude of the State, in particular because of the pressure exerted on the prisoners who had been sent to special prisons. He mentioned the Pianosa prison and how prisoners were ill-treated and isolated there and, in this respect, he said they were like branches cut from a tree. I remember that the meeting took place between the Capaci attack and the bomb attack in which Borsellino was killed. When we were together in the house near the gas station, GIOE' changed his attitude (and I thought that when he left me at the gas station he had spoken to somebody) and told me, in a detached tone: "WHAT WOULD YOU THINK IF ONE MORNING YOU WOKE UP AND DID NOT FIND THE TOWER OF PISA?" I remember I told him that if something like that happened it would be the death of a city; Pisa in this specific case, since to the city of Pisa the Tower means tourism and therefore wealth. GIOE' replied by saying that, in their view, choosing a single person as a target had limited meaning compared with the effect on different targets such as works of art, especially important works of art. To explain how I interpreted GIOE's words, I repeat what I told myself on that occasion: if a work of art is lost, it is lost for everybody and for good".
The motive's background, as it was reconstructed, shows that the aim of the 1993 bomb attacks was to facilitate "Cosa Nostra" criminal organisation's general plans and activities (remove any obstacle and risk to the organisation's internal functioning and security) and to influence, through methods and actions characterised by the use of extreme and indiscriminate violence, the course of criminal and judicial policies that have to be drawn up by the legitimate State powers, as provided for by the Constitution: consequently, the bomb attacks were part of a Mafia-terrorist strategy.
2.1.3 With reference to bomb attacks perpetrated in Rome during the night between 26 and 27 July 1993, whose targets were the Basilica di San Giovanni in Laterano (the Cathedral of Rome and, as such, it has a relationship with the Pope, Bishop of Rome) and the Church of San Giorgio al Velabro, in May 1993 the Pope went to Sicily where he delivered 18 speeches. During some of these speeches, especially the one held at the Valley of Temples in Agrigento, the Pope expressed very strong words against the perpetrators of the 1992 bomb attacks that killed Judges Falcone and Borsellino. The Pope defined Mafia as the "devil" and as "martyrs" those, catholic and non catholic, who had been killed by the organisation.
All this provoked a powerful and positive reaction on the part of the Sicilian community, and legitimated the so-called "anti-Mafia priests" who, through their apostolic mission in the areas under the strong control of Cosa Nostra, were trying to build a widespread anti-Mafia culture.
Bomb attacks whose targets were the two important churches of Rome, should be interpreted in the light of the strategy implemented by Cosa Nostra, that is to reduce to silence those who criticised their actions - and the Pope's voice was widely heard - and tried to stimulate "civil awakening" on the part of the Sicilian population.
A tragic confirmation of what I said was given in September 1993 when Cosa Nostra killed the priest Giuseppe Puglisi who was trying to counteract the Mafia power in his parish - the Brancaccio neighbourhood where many Mafia members lived - by educating youth to an honest and lawful life.
2.1.4 The investigations on the 1993 bomb attacks, carried out jointly with the public prosecutor's office of the Court of Florence, identified Cosa Nostra bosses or members as the principals and the perpetrators of the attacks. This element further confirms the Mafia-like nature of the attack and of their underlying strategy.